THINKING IN **DARK TIMES**

HANNAH ARENDT ON ETHICS AND POLITICS

Edited by Roger Berkowitz, Jeffrey Katz, and Thomas Keenan

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS New York 2010

The Pariah as Rebel

HANNAH ARENDT'S JEWISH WRITINGS

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Hannah Arendt was born in 1906 in Germany and died in 1975 in New York. Between those bookends, her life played out during what she termed the "dark times" of the twentieth century. She was a political and cultural critic, publishing many essays and books, and she is now considered among the elite of the German Jewish culture that produced so many great literary, scientific, and artistic figures. Arendt's reputation as one of her generation's most gifted political thinkers rests on two major books, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and *The Human Condition*, both published in the 1950s, and a slew of other essay collections.

Still, Arendt is probably best remembered as the author of *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, first published as a series in the *New Yorker* in 1963 and then as a book in 1964. Its now-famous subtitle was *A Report on the Banality of Evil*, a line that has been much quoted and much misunderstood. The appearance of this book about the trial of Adolf Eichmann, one of the leading Nazi organizers of what is now called the Holocaust, created a heated controversy in the Jewish community. At that time she was viciously attacked, especially for her assertion that Jewish leaders throughout Europe had "cooperated in one way or another, for one reason or another, with the Nazis,"[1] during the Holocaust. Many people were under the impression that the "banality" in the subtitle of the book demeaned the suffering of the Jews during the Holocaust, and her accusations against Jewish leaders meant that, "We are asked, it appears, to confess that the Jews, too, had their 'share' in these acts of genocide,"[2] as put by her onetime friend, the great Jewish historian Gershom Scholem. Arendt clarified her position by saying that the tragedy of the Jewish leaders was that they "were *not* traitors or Gestapo agents and *still* they became the tools of the Nazis."[3] Nevertheless, she was accused of being a self-hating Jew and largely read-out of the Jewish community.

As will be clear in what follows, I have a much more positive evaluation of Arendt's Jewish politics. I will not dwell on the Eichmann controversy, but given that my focus is on Arendt's Jewish writings, it is prudent at least to

Facing: Inscribed title page of Hannah Arendt's copy of W. H. Auden's *City Without Walls*. The inscription reads: "To Hannah with love from Wystan." Courtesy of the Hannah Arendt Collection, Stevenson Library, Bard College.

acknowledge this famous episode. Indeed, in retrospect, it is worth pointing out a double irony that has come to pass. Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion's political purpose in having Eichmann captured in Argentina, brought to Jerusalem and put on trial was to teach the world about the Holocaust, antisemitism, and the justification for a Jewish state. While Arendt concluded that Eichmann was guilty and should be hanged, she was critical of the "show trial" aspect of the proceedings, where many witnesses to the Holocaust took the stand even if their relevance to Eichmann's personal role was indirect. Arendt believed that a trial should turn on the guilt of the accused. The double irony is this: for Ben-Gurion it is ironic that Arendt's report is still read and is the main way the Eichmann trial is remembered today; yet, for Arendt it is equally ironic because, despite her criticism of the trial, she has become Ben-Gurion's long-term publicist for the main message of the trial, which was to show the world the horrors of the Holocaust.

I want to begin my exploration of Arendt's political positions and analyses by focusing on what "Jewishness" meant to her. As she writes in her famous response to Gershom Scholem, "I have always regarded my Jewishness as one of the indisputable factual data of my life, and I have never had the wish to change or disclaim facts of this kind."[4] That is, her Jewishness is a given; we might say that Arendt is an "essentialist" when it comes to being Jewish. This is the underpinning of her biting criticism, written long before the Eichmann controversy, of those Jews who sought to escape their Jewishness (especially through celebrity and fame), whom she called the "parvenus." To use a concept she would explore in *The Human Condition*, Jewishness is part of her "natality" and, because of the place and time in which she lived, this fortuitous and uncontrollable circumstance of her birth determined the basic parameters of her fate.

Yet, before the late 1920s, "Jewishness" was not the most important thing in her background or life; like most German Jews, she was culturally more German than Jewish, more secular than religious. Her education was in the classics: she learned Greek but not Hebrew. While she was interested in theology, as demonstrated in her dissertation on Saint Augustine, this was *Christian* theology analyzed from a secular philosophical perspective. And while the *Jewish Writings* includes a 1935 essay lauding Martin Buber as the "true leader" of German Jewish youth because he was able to "rediscover the living roots of . . . [Judaism's] past to build an even greater future,"[5] this is notable because it is a rare instance of documented interest in Jewish philosophy. In general, we cannot call Arendt a "Jewish philosopher or theologian" in the sense of Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Herman Cohen, or even Gershom Scholem, to name a few German Jewish luminaries; she did not engage with the Jewish textual tradition.

Rather, Arendt's Jewishness is adamantly secular and political. As for so many German Jews, its significance was thrust upon her by the rise of Nazism, but her response was not preordained or typical. As she says in a 1964 inter-

view with Günter Gaus, "my personal problem was political. Purely political! I wanted to do practical work—exclusively and only Jewish work."[6] In the German Jewish milieu of that period, simply the commitment to Jewish politics is significant, because this commitment to the Jews as a *people* is already an action and argument in opposition to Jewish assimilationists, whether secular—those seeking to pass as non-Jews because their Jewish background was simply irrelevant (or so they thought)—or religious, who claimed they were loyal "Germans of the Mosaic persuasion." Nazi antisemitism had foreclosed these options for being accepted as part of the German nation, which meant that Jewishness had become a personal problem for every German Jew. Arendt deliberately chose to affirm loyalty to the Jewish people, and she became a political person by way of Zionist activity.

After escaping Germany in 1933, she worked in France for Youth Aliyah, assisting young Jews leaving Germany for British Mandate–era Palestine. This job gave her a chance to see the Yishuv (as the pre-state Jewish-Zionist community in Palestine was called) in person when she escorted a group that traveled from France. After escaping to America in 1941 she wrote essays and, after the war, worked for Jewish Cultural Reconstruction and Schocken Books.

Although Arendt was quite critical of aspects of Theodor Herzl's Zionist philosophy, her personal transformation into a Zionist in the face of antisemitism bears many similarities to that of political Zionism's founder. For both Arendt and Herzl, their German cultural education was more significant than their Jewish education, and they had little interest in what we might call "Judaism," that is, Jewish religion or philosophy. After becoming politicized, Arendt, also like Herzl, did not display any newfound personal interest in specifically Jewish religion, philosophy, or literature, but was focused on political and historical issues. Therefore, while we might not want to describe Arendt as a Jewish philosopher, we could legitimately describe some of her writing as that of a Jewish political theorist, like Herzl and other Zionists (and anti-Zionists, for that matter).

In another important passage from her interview with Gaus, Arendt says, "I arrived at the conclusion which I always, at the time, expressed to myself in one sentence, a sentence which clarified it to me 'When one is attacked as a Jew, one must defend oneself *as a Jew*.' Not as a German, not as a world-citizen, not as an upholder of the Rights of Man."[7] This passage helps us make sense of what many readers find surprising, the lack of any overtly feminine or feminist positions in her writing, despite another "fact" of Arendt's natality, namely that she was a woman.[8] In my mind, the key reason for the lack of explicit feminist analysis in her writings is that *Arendt was politicized as a Jew*, not as a woman.[9] To invert Y. L. Gordon's famous emancipation motto, "Be a man on the street and a Jew at home," one might even say that Arendt was "a Jew on the street and a woman at home," in correspondence to the distinction between public and private realms that she develops into a key feature of her political theory.[10] It seems that Arendt assumed that she was the intellectual

equal of men, and her status as a woman simply did not matter when it came to issues of either philosophy or politics.

Arendt celebrated her path, the type of person she was, in her essay "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition." As distinct from Isaac Deutscher's famous analysis of "non-Jewish Jews"[11] who played an important part in European life, Arendt's focus was on Jews who simultaneously affirmed their Jewishness and Europeanness, whom she calls the "pariahs," those "who were great enough to transcend the bounds of nationality and to weave the strands of their Jewish genius into the general texture of European life . . . those bold spirits who tried to make of the emancipation of the Jews that which it really should have been—an admission of Jews *as Jews* to the ranks of humanity."[12] By affirming their Jewish particularity and their Europeanness, they became marginal to both European and Jewish communities. This, of course, was Arendt's fate. She was committed to, yet critical of, both inheritances and her intellectual corpus as a whole is colored by the struggle of being accepted as a Jew in the modern world.

On the Jewish side, as a secular person she had lost the religious Judaism of her ancestors and sought refuge in the concept of a Jewish people. In particular, she finds a model for the politicized "Conscious Pariah" in Bernard Lazare, a contemporary of Herzl's who briefly joined Herzl's Zionist movement but then quit because of political differences. As Arendt writes, for Lazare "the territorial question was secondary—a mere outcome of the primary demand that 'the Jews should be emancipated as a people and in the form of a nation.' What he sought was not an escape from antisemitism but a mobilization of the people against its foes." What Lazare learned, according to Arendt, is that when the Pariah enters politics, he or she becomes a rebel.

While Arendt became known as a rebel in the wake of the 1963 publication of *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, the origins of her role as critic, pundit, and gadfly can be traced back to the 1930s. For example, *The Jewish Writings* includes a previously unpublished seventy-five-page essay entitled "Antisemitism," which was drafted in the late 1930s, about the same time she was completing her biography of Rahel Varnhagen, an early-eighteenth-century German Jewish socialite. This was probably intended to be part of a future book, and some of the materials were refined and included in the first part of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, which is also entitled "Antisemitism." Nevertheless, the focus is different, and we find here an extensive critique of both assimilation and Zionism as not answering the real needs of the Jewish people.

Arendt writes, "Whereas nationalist historiography is based on the uncritical assumption of a distance on principle between Jews and their host nation, assimilationist historians opt for an equally uncritical assumption of a 100 percent correspondence between Jews and their entire host nation."[13] The problem with both is that they "arise out of a shared Jewish fear of admitting that there are and always have been divergent interests between Jews and segments of the people among whom they live."[14] Both views strip "the

relationship between Jews and their host nation of its historicity."[15] The Zionists simply turn the assimilationists' views "upside down. Where the former imagined they had become *like* the German people, the latter respond: No, as antisemitism proves, we are totally *foreign*." For Arendt, this ahistorical theory "appears to conform perfectly to the National Socialists who crystallize their worldview of a *volksgemeinschaft* [ethnic community] in antisemitism." It is from this point of critique that Arendt begins a long investigation into the emancipation, its failures, and the historical position of Jews in Europe as linked to the state as such, part of which eventually found its way into *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

One of the Zionist policies Arendt disagreed with, for example, was what was called "The Transfer Agreement," which allowed the transfer during the 1930s of some Jewish people and property from Nazi Germany to Palestine in the form of German-manufactured merchandise. While anti-Zionists point to this agreement as "proof" that Zionists collaborated with the Nazis, Arendt is critical from a Jewish perspective, arguing that "it seemed unwise for a Jewish political agency to do business with an antisemitic government."[16] This, she claimed, was a confusion of the proper "distinction between friend and foe."[17] Here she felt the Zionist Organization prioritized the building up of the Jewish homeland in Palestine over the interests of the Jewish people to oppose its enemies.

From 1941 to 1945, Arendt wrote columns in German for the New York–based *Aufbau*; these have been translated and published in *The Jewish Writings*. One of her main themes was advocating for the creation of an independent Jewish army to fight the Nazis. For example, in November 1941 Arendt writes that the Jewish people should "join the battle against Hitler as Jews, in Jewish battle formations under a Jewish flag."[18] She continues this theme until the end of the war, criticizing the Jewish and Zionist establishment, including plutocrats, philanthropists, and rabbinic "leaders" for not advocating this position more strongly to the Allies and rallying the Jewish people to action.[19] Arendt saw the issue as a practical one: close to a third of world Jewry was on the verge of annihilation, and a Jewish army could "at least *attempt* to replace the rules of extermination and the rules of flight with the rules of battle."[20] In the long term, without an army the Jews would not have a place at the peace table; fighting the war *as Jews* was a way to legitimate the Jewish demands for freedom, including the right to a homeland in Palestine.

Related to this enthusiasm for military action, Arendt celebrated the phenomenon of the Warsaw Ghetto fighters, the Jewish partisans, Jews in the Soviet army, and the Palestinian Jewish Brigade of the British army as "aspects of the same great struggle—the Jewish people's struggle for freedom."[21] It is significant, she claims, because it represents a fundamentally new political attitude among Jews: "Gone probably forever, is that chief concern of the Jewish people for centuries: survival at any price. Instead, we find something essentially new among Jews, the desire for dignity at any price."[22] On this point

Arendt shares the position of many Zionists, who were strongly critical of the "the diaspora Jew" and hoped to create a "new Jew" who would be unafraid to stand up for themselves physically and politically, thereby becoming the basis for remaking the Jewish people as a secular, political, territorial Jewish nation. Arendt saw the fighters as the vanguard of this phenomenon.[23] Yet she also cautioned that this desire for dignity rather than survival can result in a dangerous "readiness for suicide"[24] that later came to be called "the Masada complex." Moreover, Arendt strongly rejected one group that also advocated the formation of a Jewish army, the right-wing Zionist Revisionists, a party she heartily rejected as "terrorist" and "Fascist."[25]

As the war progressed, Arendt became increasingly distraught at the lack of action among Jews in the face of news concerning the concentration camps and mass murder of Jews. Indeed, reading Arendt's *Aufbau* articles reveals how much it was possible to know about these events during the war if one was paying attention, despite the claims of many people after the war to not have known what was happening.

From 1945 to 1948 Arendt was also a critic of the Zionist movement's policy advocating the establishment of a Jewish state. Instead, she stood with a small minority (including Martin Buber and Judah Magnes) that advocated a binational state as part of an internationally negotiated and agreed settlement in Palestine. Like Buber and Magnes, her reasons were not in principle anti-Zionist: she believed that in the post–World War II period the nation-state system was passé and would be replaced either by federations of peoples (perhaps on the model of the United States, USSR, or British Commonwealth) or by empires. Arendt made an important distinction between a Jewish *homeland* and a Jewish nation-state. "Palestine can be saved as the national homeland of Jews only if . . . it is integrated into a federation."[26] She feared that the demand for a Jewish State would result in failure: in the worst case, it would lead to military defeat, which if it occurred so soon after the Holocaust might be the beginning of the "self-dissolution of the Jewish people."[27] At best, a Jewish state that could not establish peace with its neighbors would ruin the positive achievements of Zionism in Palestine, eventually leading to a chauvinism that "could use the religious concept of the chosen people and allow its meaning to degenerate into hopeless vulgarity."[28]

Arendt's worst fears about the demise of the state of Israel and the decline of its political culture proved wrong. Nevertheless, she was prescient concerning the prominent role that the military and nationalist thought would take in Israeli politics, the difficulty of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict when both sides refuse to give up on their nationalistic perspectives and claims, and how Israel would become dependent on the financial and political support of diaspora Jewry, especially in the United States—clearly not a situation of independence and true sovereignty. One might say that, to use Arendt's terminology, the pariah people gave birth to a pariah state.

Overall, what we see in Arendt's writings of the 1930s and 1940s is her

engagement in "Jewish politics." Her attempt was to find a different way through the positions of the assimilationists and the state-oriented Zionists. Her focus, instead, was on what she called the "Jewish people," which was a concept that encompassed but went beyond political Zionism's practical focus on building up the homeland in Palestine. The homeland was important as a center for Jewish cultural pride and renewal, but it was not a political answer to the immediate threat that Nazism posed to European Jewry. For Arendt, the "lifeboat" solution of a Jewish state was insufficient because of the urgency and magnitude of the Holocaust. In taking on this view, she was speaking from the perspective of a conscious Pariah, a rebel à la Bernard Lazare. Arendt was concerned with the fate of the masses of Jews in Europe under the Nazis, which she felt needed to be the main front.

Arendt wanted to have the Jews recognized as a European nation, and in 1940 she wrote that Jews should have representation in "a European parliament" because the Jews were an integral part of the peoples of Europe.[29] "For the first time, Jewish history is not separate but tied up with that of all other nations. The comity of European peoples went to pieces when, and because, it allowed its weakest member to be excluded and persecuted."[30] This view, which insistently integrates the Jews and Europe, is reflected in Arendt's formulation of the concept of a "crime against humanity" in *Eichmann in Jerusalem*:

> It was when the Nazi regime declared that the German people not only were unwilling to have any Jews in Germany but wished to make the entire Jewish people disappear from the face of the earth that the new crime, the crime against humanity—in the sense of a crime 'against the human status,' or against the very nature of mankind—appeared. . . . The supreme crime . . . was a crime against humanity, perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish people, and . . . only the choice of victims, not the nature of the crime, could be derived from the long history of Jew-hatred and antisemitism.[31]

Arendt was already thinking beyond the nation-state system when she advocated a federation as a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. She felt that while the Jews had the right to live as a community in their "homeland," she identified herself as a "non-nationalist" who believed that a federation of Middle Eastern peoples was the best way to assure the Yishuv's safety and vitality.[32] She was in favor of a Jewish homeland, and despite her opposition to statehood continued to be concerned with the welfare and fate of Israel, even as she was critical of certain aspects and policies. While Buber and Magnes clearly counted themselves as "Zionists," I would categorize Arendt as a "non-Zionist,"[33] not an "anti-Zionist." Despite her opposition to statehood, she was not anti-Zionist in the fashion of the assimilationist or religious Jews, for whom Zionism's assertion of Jewish nationalism was anathema, or of non-Jews who rejected the Jews' right to build a national home in Palestine, such as the Arabs.

Arendt's attitude was that of a loyal critic, and criticism is not self-hatred. As she puts it in her letter to Scholem, "there can be no patriotism without permanent opposition."[34] Jewish politics, like all politics, is based on answering the fundamental question: What is best for our community—or, in this specific case: What is good for the Jews? In my view, Arendt is "loyal" because she counts herself as part of the community effected by the answers to this question—a "critic" because she is often disapproves of the powers that be and the policies they are practicing, which she sees as *bad for the Jews*. Whether or not one agrees with her positions, this is the perspective of a Jew, not that of a world-citizen or an upholder of the Rights of Man.

The issue at stake here is one that continues to be a challenge: the parameters of loyal criticism within the Jewish community. This is an issue in both the diaspora and Israel, but it plays out differently in each venue.

The organized "leadership" of the American Jewish community was (and continues to be) mostly a self-selected, voluntary group of wealthy philanthropists that is largely governed in the traditional diaspora fashion going back to the Court Jews, which Hannah Arendt critiqued as a plutocracy that "embraces prominence, philanthropy, and political representation."[35] As Arendt puts it in an *Aufbau* article, "the misfortune of the Jewish people . . . has been that the parvenu has been more important than the pariah; that Rothschild was more representative than Heine. . . . Donning the mask of the philanthropist, the parvenu poisoned all Jews, forcing his ideals upon them."[36]

One aspect of this plutocratic system is that the range of self-criticism is limited: the American Jewish community continues the diasporic tradition of being nervous about fitting in and getting along with the gentiles. Jewish identity and politics in the postwar era has focused on two topics: remembering the Holocaust and supporting Israel. This is best understood as a Jewish civil religion, a paradigm of destruction and redemption that focuses and displaces Jewish identity away from contemporary America toward places that are distant in time and place.[37] Far outweighing the importance of traditional Jewish religious practices, during the second half of the twentieth century this became the focus of public Jewish identity, defining contemporary Jews to both themselves and the gentiles. Hannah Arendt, of course, engaged both these issues at length, but her critical perspectives on both topics—an internal critique from a Jewish point of view—was like touching a high-voltage third rail, engendering reactions she did not anticipate.

The question of "loyal opposition" is also alive in Israel. Of course, it is worth noting that there is a qualitative difference between Jewish politics in the diaspora and Israel, for unlike the philanthropic politics of the diaspora, in Israel there is a very vigorous democratic political life, where the parliament is based on proportional representation, the government is always a coalition of many parties, and where views of every sort are part of daily debate. Yet, Arendt was neglected in Israel—one might even say boycotted—until the 1990s. Since then there has been a rediscovery of Arendt among younger

scholars and intellectuals, and she has begun to take on an iconic stature as a *Jewish* political thinker who went beyond traditional Zionism. In 1997 an International conference on Hannah Arendt was held in Israel, organized by Steven Aschheim, and in 2003 a conference of Israeli scholars took place, organized by Idith Zertal and Moshe Zuckermann. Both conferences produced collections of essays, the first in English and the second in Hebrew.[38] Arendt's works are beginning to be translated into Hebrew—starting with *Eichmann in Jerusalem* in 2000. More than this, her image is entering into the realm of art and literature. In November 2006 there was an exhibit in Jerusalem of a series of portraits of Arendt by the Israeli artist Shy Abady, an exhibit that appeared in Germany the prior year.[39] [Abady's portrait of Arendt, "Dark Times," appears as the frontispiece to this volume.—Eds.] In 2006 a work of fiction, *The Visitation of Hannah Arendt*, by Michal Ben-Naftali appeared in Hebrew, describing hypothetical conversations between Arendt and the author.[40] Part of this interest in Arendt is fueled by the development since the mid-1990s of "post-Zionism," and some look to Arendt as a precursor.[41] Regardless of the label, Arendt's thought and image are being used as models for how to engage in Jewish politics while going beyond the timeworn domestic Israeli civil religion of Zionism that sees the Jews as eternal victims.

Whether one agrees with Arendt's particular positions on Jewish political issues, I contend that her stance is of lasting significance: she assumes the existence of a Jewish people and a Jewish polity that is sufficiently strong, proud and secure that all Jews have an inherent right to engage in vigorous political debate. While I have never agreed with all of Arendt's views, I find her Jewish writings to be a continuing model for engaged Jewish political speech.

Nevertheless, I want to make it clear that even if a "Jewish" Hannah Arendt can be reclaimed, this does not mean we should categorize or ghettoize her work as a whole as a "Jewish" political theory. Her experience as a Jew in the twentieth century, as someone who worked for Jewish organizations and wrote about Jewish political concerns in the 1930s and 1940s, is an important basis and background for her later work. Ultimately we need to see her as one of those "pariahs" who, as Arendt wrote, "were great enough to transcend the bounds of nationality and to weave the strands of their Jewish genius into the general texture of European life."

In this sense, the Jews were an example for Arendt, perhaps the first victims, but not only the first victims. Indeed, Arendt rejects the politics of victimization, which has become so popular today, where each interest group seeks to portray itself as wronged and thereby, somehow, absolved of responsibility for the world as a whole and its place therein. Arendt's critiques of Jewish emancipation, of Zionism, and of Jewish leadership rest on the premise that all people, even those who are oppressed and persecuted, nevertheless bear *some* responsibility for the world. Through their responses to their situation, even the victims play a role in co-creating and maintaining a human world of freedom that is shared by all people, a possibility that exists anew at every moment.

19. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 4th ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1968), 296–302.
20. For the structure of "the so-called totalitarian state," see ibid., 389–459.
21. Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, 400–401. Later, in *The Human Condition* and *On Violence*, Arendt analyzes power and sovereignty as antithetical concepts.
22. A world spectator is sharply to be distinguished from a world citizen. Arendt, after Kant, views a world government as the greatest tyranny imaginable (*Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, 44).
23. See Hannah Arendt, *Between Past and Future* (New York: Viking Press, 1968), 146.
24. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 1st ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951), 439, and repeated in all of Arendt's major works.
25. Ideological "truth" is the dark underbelly or perversion of the philosophic truth discussed here. For Arendt's account of the spread of world alienation and the emergence of mass men, see *The Human Condition*, 245–325.
26. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 4th ed., 459. In this respect, radical evil is not coextensive with genocide, which in fact (if not in name) is as old as human history. Even the Turks' genocide of Christian Armenians, often evoked as analogous to the Holocaust, had the transparent "political" motive of shoring up the disintegrating Moslem Ottoman Empire.
27. Ibid., 474–475.
28. Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 1st edition, 437, 439.
29. Today Barack Obama's appeal is to such citizens of the United States of America.
30. "Crimes against humanity" were first announced in the trials of high-ranking Nazi officials at Nuremberg, in which, in Arendt's opinion, they were never sufficiently distinguished from "war crimes" and "crimes against peace."
31. Hannah Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 153.
32. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), 136.
33. Ibid., 116–126; the quoted words are on 125–126.
34. Arendt, *Thinking*, 3–5.
35. The brilliant, devastating center of *Eichmann in Jerusalem* is Chapter VIII, "Duties of a Law-Abiding Citizen."
36. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 30. For a fuller account of Eichmann's "incorruptibility" than can be offered here see Jerome Kohn, "Arendt's Concept and Description of Totalitarianism," *Social Research* 69, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 621–656.
37. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 279.
38. Ibid., 253–272 (the quotations are on 268 and 269). Nevertheless Arendt, unlike her friend and mentor Karl Jaspers, believed the trial of Eichmann was rightly held in Israel, under Israeli law, absent "an international criminal court" and "an international penal code."
39. Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, 185–189.
40. This limiting case, in which the impotence of thinking liberates the faculty of judgment, has no bearing on the lack of political judgment in such a thinker as Martin Heidegger.
41. *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 273.
42. Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, 493 (emphasis in the original).
43. Ibid., 471.
44. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 252.
45. Kant, who destroyed that equation and first introduced the notion of "radical evil," is an exception. For the "nonbeing" of evil, see Jerome Kohn, "Evil and Plurality," in *Hannah Arendt: Twenty Years Later*, ed. Larry May and Jerome Kohn (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), 147–178.
46. Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, 125.
47. *Between Friends: The Correspondence of Hannah Arendt and Mary McCarthy, 1949–1975*, ed. Carol Brightman (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995), 168.
48. These essays, which include "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy," are collected in *Responsibility and Judgment*, 17–189.

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1. Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1964), 125.

2. Gershom Scholem, *On Jews and Judaism in Crisis* (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), 304.
3. Hannah Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, ed. Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 497.
4. Ibid., 466.
5. Ibid., 33.
6. "'What Remains? The Language Remains': A Conversation with Günter Gaus," in *Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954*, ed. Jerome Kohn (San Diego: Harcourt Brace, 1994), 12.
7. Ibid., 11–12. This position, by the way, was reflected in a 1941 *Aufbau* article in which she wrote, "One truth that is unfamiliar to the Jewish people, though they are beginning to learn it, is that *you can only defend yourself as the person you are attacked as*. A person attacked as a Jew cannot defend himself as an Englishman or Frenchman." Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, 137.
8. Of course, Arendt does discuss Jewish women, both as ghetto fighters (for example, the *Aufbau* article, "A Lesson in Six Shots," *The Jewish Writings*, 217–219) and in her historical research on German socialites (see "Original Assimilation," *The Jewish Writings*, 22–28, and *Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewish Woman* [New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1974]).
9. There is a lively discussion in the secondary literature concerning Arendt's feminism. See for example, Bonnie Honig, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).
10. This idea of Arendt as a woman at home was also conveyed at the end of the conference where this paper was initially presented. During a visit to the gravesites of Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher at Bard College, Jack Blum (Bard '62), who was a student of Blücher's, told stories of his friendship with them. Blum related that when he visited Blücher at their home in New York City, Arendt acted the role of the German *hausfrau*, serving food and drink. It was only later, as he got to know the couple, that Arendt's own intellectual stature became clear. [This story is retold in the interview published in this volume, "Remembering Hannah: An Interview with Jack Blum."—Eds.]
11. Isaac Deutscher, *The Non-Jewish Jew and Other Essays*, ed. Tamara Deutscher (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).
12. Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, 275.
13. Ibid., 50.
14. Ibid., 51.
15. Ibid., 50.
16. Ibid., 415.
17. Ibid., 415.
18. Ibid., 137.
19. Ibid., 162, 165.
20. Ibid., 160.
21. Ibid., 214.
22. Ibid., 386.
23. Ibid., 200.
24. Ibid., 387.
25. Ibid., 417. See, for example, the *Aufbau* article "Philistine Dynamite" (*The Jewish Writings*, 208–211) from June 1944 and her December 1948 letter to the *New York Times* (*The Jewish Writings*, 417–419) criticizing Menachem Begin, who would become prime minister in 1977, shortly after Arendt's death.
26. Ibid., 195.
27. Ibid., 395
28. Ibid., 450.
29. Ibid., 131. It should be noted that Arendt is very Eurocentric and displays little knowledge of non-European Jewry.
30. Ibid., 274.
31. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem*, 268–269.
32. See, for example, "Peace or Armistice in the Near East?" in *The Jewish Writings*, 423–450, especially 446–450.
33. See, for example, her use of the term in "To Save the Jewish Homeland," in *The Jewish Writings*, 394.
34. Ibid., 467.
35. Ibid., 71.
36. Ibid., 141.
37. The origins of my views and formulations of this subject can be found in Jacob Neusner's book *Stranger at Home: "The Holocaust," Zionism, and American Judaism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
38. Steven Aschheim, ed., *Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Idit Zertal and Moshe Zuckerman, eds., *Hannah Arendt: A*

Half-Century of Polemics (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2004).

39. Shy Abady, *The Hannah Arendt Project* (art exhibit, Frankfurt, 2005).
40. Michal Ben-Naftali, *The Visitation of Hannah Arendt* (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 2006).
41. See, for example, Moshe Zimmermann, "Hannah Arendt, the Early 'Post-Zionist,'" in Aschheim, *Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem*, 181–193.

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1. Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, Herbert Marcuse* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
2. See the complete text of her letter in *The Jewish Writings*, ed. Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 465–471.
3. For further clarification of the term "pariah" and its opposite, "parvenu," as used by Arendt, see my article "Hannah Arendt's Jewish Identity: Neither Parvenu nor Pariah," *European Journal of Political Theory* 3, no. 2 (2004): 177–190.
4. Hannah Arendt and Karl Jaspers, *Correspondence, 1926–1969*, ed. Lotte Kohler and Hans Saner (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1985), Letter 134, August 23, 1952, 192.
5. Ibid., letter 135, September 7, 1952, 200–201. This is not the only time that Arendt was accused of being loveless. Many years later, Gershom Scholem accused her of lacking any love for the Jewish people in her book on Eichmann.
6. *Within Four Walls: the Correspondence Between Hannah Arendt and Heinrich Blücher, 1936-1968*, ed. Lotte Kohler (San Diego: Harcourt, 2001), August 21, 1936, 14–18.
7. Arendt, *The Jewish Writings*, 136–139.
8. *Within Four Walls*, 172.
9. Ibid., 179.
10. Ibid., 227
11. Natan Sznaider, "Hannah Arendt's Jewish Cosmopolitanism Between the Universal and the Particular," *European Journal of Social Theory* 10, no. 1 (2007): 112–122.
12. Hannah Arendt and Kurt Blumenfeld . . . *in keinem Besitz verwurzelt':Die Korrespondenz*, ed. Ingeborg Nordmann and Iris Pilling (Munich: Piper, 1995), letter 74, May 19, 1957, 191. My translation.

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1. Amartya Sen, *Identity & Violence: The Illusion of Destiny* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).
2. W. H. Auden, "We Too Had Known Golden Hours," *Collected Shorter Poems, 1927–57* (New York: Random House, 1967), 318.
3. Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951), 9.
4. As cited in Jerome Kohn, "Thinking/Acting," *Social Research* 57 (1990): 117.
5. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 311.
6. Section 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states, "Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected."
7. Section 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.
8. For an excellent discussion on the radical significance of horizontality, see, generally, Johan van der Walt, *Sacrifice and Law: Towards a Post-Apartheid Theory of* Law (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2005).
9. In the *Khosa* case, Justice Mokgoro argued that in South Africa you are a human being before you are a citizen, in extending certain welfare benefits to Mozambican refugees. See generally, *Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others; Mahlaule and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others* 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC).
10. For an interesting discussion of the complexity of this attempt to develop an ethical foreign policy, see Patrick Bond *Talk Left Walk Right* (Scottsville, South Africa: University of KwaZulu Natal Press, 2006).
11. For a discussion on the debate over horizontality, see Richard Spitz and Matthew Chaskalson *The Politics of Transition: a hidden history of South Africa's negotiated settlement* (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2000), 268–279.
12. Van der Walt, *Sacrifice and Law*, 39.
13. Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on Little Rock," in *Responsibility and Judgement* (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 193.